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In society, mutual cooperation, defection, and asymmetric exploitative relationships are
common. Whereas cooperation and defection are studied extensively in the literature on
game theory, asymmetric exploitative relationships between players are little explored. In
a recent study, Press and Dyson [1] demonstrate that if only one player can learn about
the other, asymmetric exploitation is achieved in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In contrast,
however, it is unknown whether such one-way exploitation is stably established when both
players learn about each other symmetrically and try to optimize their payoffs. Here, we first
formulate a dynamical system that describes the change in a player’s probabilistic strategy
with reinforcement learning to obtain greater payoffs, based on the recognition of the other
player. By applying this formulation to the standard prisoner’s dilemma game, we numeri-
cally and analytically demonstrate that an exploitative relationship can be achieved despite
symmetric strategy dynamics and symmetric rule of games. This exploitative relationship
is stable, even though the exploited player, who receives a lower payoff than the exploiting
player, has optimized the own strategy. Whether the final equilibrium state is mutual coop-
eration, defection, or exploitation, crucially depends on the initial conditions: Punishment
against a defector oscillates between the players, and thus a complicated basin structure to
the final equilibrium appears. In other words, slight differences in the initial state may lead
to drastic changes in the final state. Considering the generality of the result, this study
provides a new perspective on the origin of exploitation in society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Equality is not easily achieved in society; instead, inequality among individuals is common.
Exploitative behavior, in which one individual receives a greater benefit at the expense of others
receiving lower benefits, is frequently observed. Of course, such exploitation can originate from
a priori differences in individual capacities or environmental conditions. However, such exploita-
tion is also developed and sustained historically. Even when inherent individual capacities or
environmental conditions are not different, and even when individuals are able to choose other
actions to escape exploitation and optimize their benefits, exploitation somehow remains.
In this study, we consider how such exploitation emerges and is sustained. Of course ad-
dressing this question completely is too difficult, as the answer may involve economics, sociology,
history, and so forth. Instead, we simplify the problem by adopting a game theoretic framework,
and investigate whether exploitative behavior can emerge a posteriori as a result of dynamics in
individuals’ cognitive structures. We check whether “symmetry breaking” can occur when indi-
viduals have symmetric capacities and environmental conditions. Then, we investigate whether
one player may choose an action to accept a lower score than the other even though both players
have the same payoff matrix and even though the exploited player can potentially recover the
symmetry and receive the same payoff as the exploiting player.
For this analysis, we adopt the celebrated prisoner’s dilemma game, which can potentially
exhibit the exploitation of one player by another. In this game, both players can independently
choose cooperation or defection. Regardless of the other player’s choice, defection is more
beneficial than cooperation, but the payoff when both players defect is lower than that when
both players cooperate. In this game, an exploitative relationship is represented by unequal
cooperation probabilities between the players, as a defector can get higher benefit at the expense
of a cooperator.
In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the emergence and sustainability of cooperation, even though
defection is any individual player’s best choice, has been extensively investigated [2, 3]. Cooper-
ation can indeed emerge in repeated games in which each player chooses his/her own action (co-
operation or defection) depending on the other’s previous actions. In other words, a cooperative
relationship emerges with the potential for punishment. Players cooperate conditionally with
cooperators and defect against defectors (e.g., by a tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy). In evolutionary
games, cooperation is known to stably emerge from the introduction of a “space structure” [4],
3“hierarchical structure” [5], or “stochastic transition of rule” [6], and so forth, in which a certain
punishment mechanism against defection is commonly adopted.
In contrast to the intensive and extensive studies on cooperative relationships, however, stud-
ies on exploitative relationships (i.e., asymmetric cooperation between two players) are limited.
A recent study proposes zero-determinant strategies [1], classified as one-memory strategies, in
which one player stochastically determines whether to cooperate or defect depending on the
condition on the previous actions of both players. If a player one-sidedly adopts and fixes the
zero-determinant strategy while the other accordingly optimizes his/her own strategy, the former
player can exploit the latter. Here, however, the study focuses only on one-way learning. Hence,
the two players have different ability in the beginning. Thus, whether reciprocal optimization
between two symmetric players can generate an exploitative relationship remains unresolved.
Indeed, in the studies of evolutionary game with zero-determinant strategies, the cooperation
[7] or generosity [8] is promoted, rather than the fixation of the exploitative relationship.
Besides the study of evolutionary game, a learning process, coupled replicator model, was
introduced in the game theory for reciprocal changes in strategies [9–11]. Such models use a
deterministic reinforcement learning process in which every player has a probability distribu-
tion that provides a probabilistic strategy for taking actions. During a repeated game, a player
changes his/her strategy following the resulting payoff. Thus, if the other player’s strategy is
fixed, a player increases his/her own payoff throughout the repeated game. When this cou-
pled replicator model is adopted for the prisoner’s dilemma, however, neither exploitation nor
cooperation emerges because the players in the model have no memories.
In this study, we extend the model in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma such that the
conditional strategy depends on the previous action. The reference of other’s behavior is justified
by an ability to make a model on the other’s strategy [12–14]. Then, we discuss whether an
exploitative relationship emerges regardless of reciprocal optimization. We also demonstrate
that a small difference in initial strategies is amplified, leading to the exploitation of one player
by the other.
II. MODEL
We study the well-known prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game (see Fig. 1 for the payoff matrix),
in which each of two players, referred to as players 1 and 2, chooses to cooperate (C) or defect
(D). Thus, a game involves one of four possible actions, CC, CD, DC, and DD, where the right
(left) index shows player 1’s (2’s) choice. For actions CC, CD, DC, and DD, player 1’s score is
given by R, S, T , and P , respectively. In the PD game, defection is more beneficial regardless
4of the other player’s action, meaning that both T > R and P > S hold. In addition, mutual
cooperation (CC) is more beneficial than the mutual defection (DD), meaning that R > P
holds. A repeated game requires the additional condition that 2R > T + S. In other words,
sequential cooperation (i.e., always choosing CC) is more beneficial than reciprocal defection
and cooperation (i.e., repeatedly alternating between CD and DC).
FIG. 1. Schematic diagram for the prisoner’s dilemma game and the strategy. Player 1 (horizontal) and
2 (vertical) independently choose their own actions from C and D. The resultant payoff T , R, P , and S
are displayed. The black arrows indicate the stochastic transition from the previous action to the next
one, by using the probabilistic strategy in the text.
We next define a class of strategy (see Fig. 1), in which one player stochastically determines
whether to choose C or D based on the other player’s action in the previous round. Player
1’s strategy is given by two variables that represent the probabilities of cooperation in the
next round, xC and xD, when player 2 was previously a cooperator or defector, respectively.
Conversely, xC := 1−xC (xD := 1−xD) indicates the probability that player 1’s present action
is D when the other’s previous action is C (D). Throughout the this study, we use the definition
X := 1−X. Similarly, player 2’s strategy is given by yC and yD. These strategies include several
well-known strategies, All-D (xC = xD = 0), All-C (xC = xD = 1), and TFT (xC = 1, xD = 0),
as extreme cases.
A. Repeated game for fixed strategies
Before considering the dynamics of each player’s strategy, we consider each player’s resulting
action and payoff when the strategies (i.e., xC , xD, yC , and yD) are fixed. We assume that (CC,
CD, DC, DD) is played with probability p := (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD)
T in the previous period.
Then, the probabilities of the occurrence of (CC, CD, DC, DD) in the next round are obtained
5by operating the 4× 4 Markov matrix M , which is given by
M :=


xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD
xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD
xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD
xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD


. (1)
For a given fixed (xC , xD, yC , yD), the probability is updated as p
′ = Mp. Thus, after a
sufficient number of iterated games, the probabilities converge to an equilibrium, pe. Here, this
equilibrium state is uniquely defined at least when 0 < xC , xD, yC , yD < 1 is satisfied by the
full connectivity of M . The equilibrium state, pe, is represented as the eigenvector of the above
matrix corresponding to the 1-eigenvalue, which is written with only two variables, xe and ye,
as
pe = (xeye, xeye, xeye, xe ye)
T (2)
(see the Supporting Information for the derivation). Here, note that each player unconditionally
cooperates with probabilities xe and ye in the equilibrium state, which are given by
xe(xC , xD, yC , yD) =
xD + (xC − xD)yD
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
ye(xC , xD, yC , yD) =
yD + (yC − yD)xD
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
.
(3)
At the equilibrium state, the payoff of player 1 (2), denoted by ue (ve), is given by
ue(xC , xD, yC , yD) = pe · (R,S, T, P )
T,
ve(xC , xD, yC , yD) = pe · (R,T, S, P )
T.
(4)
We emphasize that the equilibrium state for a repeated game is denoted by the subscript e, but
it is unrelated to the equilibrium of learning dynamics discussed in the following subsection.
B. Learning dynamics of strategies
Next, we consider the dynamic changes in strategies created by a reinforcement learning
process. During a repeated game, every player takes actions following his/her own strategy and
reinforces the probability of cooperation or defection depending on the gained payoff. Here, we
assume that the strategy updates occur much more slowly than the repetition of games does.
Under this assumption, every player can accurately evaluate the benefit gained by a single action
and update his/her own strategy to increase his/her payoff under an assumption that the other
player’s strategy is fixed.
6First, we compute player 1’s payoff resulting from a cooperative action in a single game,
which is denoted by uC . By assuming a repeated games equilibrium, we calculate the payoff
using p = p1C := (ye, ye, 0, 0)
T, because CC (CD) occurs with probability ye (ye) and neither
DC nor DD is chosen. Note that pe is not updated during the repeated game. Then, we obtain
uC :=
{
∞∑
t=0
M t(p1C − pe) + pe
}
· (R,S, T, P )T
=
∞∑
t=0
M t(p1C − pe) · (R,S, T, P )
T + ue.
(5)
In the same way, we obtain player 1’s defecting probability p1D and the resulting payoff uD as
p1D := (0, 0, ye, ye)
T,
uD :=
{
∞∑
t=0
M t(p1D − pe) + pe
}
· (R,S, T, P )T.
(6)
Second, we consider the update of xC by player 1 based on the above payoffs uC and uD.
The advantage of cooperation relative to the average is given by uC − (xCuC + xCuD). Then,
xC increases proportionally. Note that since player 2’s previous action and player 1’s present
action need to be C and C, respectively, the probability of using strategy xC is given by yexC .
Then, we obtain the evolution of xC over time as
x˙C = yexC{uC − (xCuC + xCuD)}
= xCxCye(uC − uD).
(7)
Here, (uC − uD) is given by
uC − uD =
(yC − yD){xe(R− S) + xe(T − P )} − {ye(T −R) + ye(P − S)}
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
(8)
(see the Supporting Information for a detailed calculation). The dynamics of xD are similarly
obtained as
˙xD = yexD{uC − (xDuC + xDuD)}
= xDxD ye(uC − uD).
(9)
In the same way, the dynamics of player 2’s strategy are given by
˙yC = yCyCxe(vC − vD),
˙yD = yDyD xe(vC − vD),
vC − vD =
(xC − xD){ye(R− S) + ye(T − P )} − {xe(T −R) + xe(P − S)}
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
(10)
7Note that xe and ye are also time-dependent, because xe and ye are given as functions of time-
dependent variables (xC , xD, yC , yD).
The above learning dynamics can be divided into three terms. For example, we focus on the
dynamics of xC , given by Eq. 7. The first term, xCxC , represents frequency-dependent selection.
When xC is close to 0 or 1, evolution proceeds slowly over time because the non-dominant
strategy rarely appears. Thus, the evolution to this strategy takes a long time under a biased
population distribution. The second term, ye, represents the dependence of the evolutionary
speed of xC upon its frequency of use, because the other player cooperates with the probability ye
in the previous action. The third term, uC−uD, represents that the change rate of the strategy is
proportional to the difference in resultant payoffs by C and D, due to the reinforcement learning.
The learning dynamics extend the previous “coupled replicator model” [9–11] to include mem-
ory of the other’s previous action. Indeed in the coupled replicator model, reinforcement learning
of conditional strategies is not adopted. The first term, the effect of frequency-dependent selec-
tion, is common to this model and previous models. However, the second term, i.e., the effect of
conditional time evolution, is not found in the previous studies [9–11]. A term that corresponds
to our third term, i.e., the effect of the payoff gap, exists therein, but the computation of the
payoff differs. Specifically, in the previous studies, only the payoff in the present period is con-
sidered because the deviation from the equilibrium state is completely relaxed by a single game,
and no conditional strategies are used. In contrast, in the present model, we need to consider
the whole process by which a deviation from the equilibrium state affects future periods over
the long term, as is shown in Eqs. 5 and 6.
C. Intuitive interpretation of the model
The above equilibrium state (Eq. 2) and learning dynamics (Eqs. 7, 8, and 10) seem compli-
cated at first glance. However, we can intuitively interpret them by employing the concept of
the response function [15].
First, we introduce the response function. We consider the situation in which player 2
cooperates with probability y independent of player 1’s previous actions. Player 1, with strategies
given by xC and xD, also becomes an unconditional cooperator with probability fx(y) = y(xC−
xD) + xD (see the Supporting Information for a detailed calculation). Indeed, against player
y = 1 (i.e., a pure cooperator), fx(1) = xC holds, whereas, against a pure defector, fx(0) = xD
holds. Since fx is player 1’s probability of cooperating given player 2’s probability of cooperating,
we call it the “response function”, following the previous studies [15].
Second, the equilibrium probabilities of cooperation, xe and ye in Eq. 2, are interpreted as
8the crossing point of both the response functions, as shown in Fig. 2. In other words,
xe = fx(ye)
ye = fy(xe).
(11)
hold. Indeed, Eq. 11 is equivalent to Eq. 3.
FIG. 2. Interpretation of the equilibrium state for repeated games. The horizontal (vertical) axis indicates
the unconditional probability of player 1 (2) to cooperate. Blue, green, red, and magenta dots indicate
the strategies xC , xD, yC , and yD, respectively. Accordingly response functions fx(y) (fy(x)) is given
by connecting xC (yC) with xD (yD). The crossing point of response functions (black dot) agrees with
(xe, ye), which is each player’s probability to cooperate in the equilibrium of repeated game.
Third, the above learning dynamics (Eqs. 7, 8, and 10) can be easily written by using the
response function (see the Supporting Information for a detailed calculation). Here, we only
focus on Eq. 7 as an example. The second term, ye, corresponds to the contribution to a change
in the crossing point against a change in xC . Thus, we obtain
ye ∝
∂xe
∂xC
. (12)
In addition, the third term, uC − uD, corresponds to the gradient of a player’s payoff on the
other player’s response function. In other words, we obtain
uC − uD ∝
∂u(xe, fy(xe))
∂xe
∣∣∣∣
y=ye
. (13)
From Eqs. 12 and 13, with cancelling the extra components, we can rewrite Eq. 7 as
x˙C = xCxC
∂ue
∂xC
. (14)
The same equation holds for the dynamics of xD, yC , and yD. The learning dynamics are
interpreted by associating the frequency-dependent selection term, xCxC , and the adaptive
learning term, ∂ue/∂xC .
9III. ANALYSIS OF LEARNING EQUILIBRIUM
Now, we actually simulate the above learning dynamics. Fig. 3 shows the final states of
(x∗e , y
∗
e ) given various initial states (x
o
C , x
o
D, y
o
C , y
o
D). Below, the superscript o (∗) denotes an
initial (a final) value of learning dynamics. Here, instead of directly plotting four-dimensional
players’ strategies (x∗C , x
∗
D, y
∗
C , y
∗
D), we plot only their two-dimensional projection to (x
∗
e , y
∗
e ),
which is the crossing point generated by their response functions.
From the figure, we see that in the case of T −R−P+S ≤ 0, only (1) pure DD (x∗e = y
∗
e = 0)
and (2) pure CC (x∗e = y
∗
e = 0) strategies can be achieved. In the case of T − R − P + S > 0,
however, (3) the intermediate states 0 < x∗e , y
∗
e < 1, which include the case of x
∗
e 6= y
∗
e , can also
be achieved. We now analyze these fixed points mathematically.
FIG. 3. (A): Final state of learning dynamics in the case of (T,R, P, S) = (5, 3, 1, 0). Many sets of fixed
(x∗
e
, y∗
e
) satisfy 0 ≤ x∗
e
, y∗
e
≤ 1 with asymmetry between them. (B): Final state of learning dynamics
in the case of (T,R, P, S) = (5, 4.5, 1, 0). Only two sets, (x∗
e
, y∗
e
) = (0, 0) and (1, 1), are reachable. For
both the cases, initial states are uniformly chosen as (xoC , x
o
D, y
o
C , y
o
D) = ((2i− 1)/2N, (2j− 1)/2N, (2k−
1)/2N, (2l − 1)/2N)) with (i, j, k, l) = 1, · · · , N and N = 10. Accordingly xo
e
and yo
e
can take values in
[0, 1]. See the Supporting Information for the animation of each dynamics.
A. Analysis of each fixed point
(1): The pure DD fixed point is given by y∗e = x
∗
D = x
∗
e = y
∗
D = 0, which satisfies x˙C =
˙xD = ˙yC = ˙yD = 0. Here, x
∗
D = y
∗
D = 0 are clearly satisfied from x
∗
e = y
∗
e = 0. Instead, x
∗
C
and y∗C are arbitrary. Then, the linear stability analysis shows that the fixed point is stable if
u∗C − u
∗
D ≤ 0 and v
∗
C − v
∗
D ≤ 0 are additionally satisfied. These conditions are equivalent to
x∗C , y
∗
C ≤ (P −S)/(T −P ). Thus, the pure DD fixed-point attractor exists on a two-dimensional
plane with continuous values of xC and yC .
(2): The pure CC fixed point is given by x∗C = y
∗
e = y
∗
C = x
∗
e = 1, which satisfies x˙C = ˙xD =
10
˙yC = ˙yD = 0. Here, x
∗
C = y
∗
C = 1 are clearly satisfied from x
∗
e = y
∗
e = 1. Instead, x
∗
D and y
∗
D
are arbitrary. Then, the fixed point is linearly stable if u∗C − u
∗
D ≥ 0 and v
∗
C − v
∗
D ≥ 0. These
conditions are equivalent to x∗D, y
∗
D ≤ 1 − (T − R)/(R − S). Thus, the pure CC fixed-point
attractor also exists on a two-dimensional plane in which x∗D and y
∗
D continuously change. Note
that x∗C − x
∗
D ≥ (T − R)/(R − S) and y
∗
C − y
∗
D ≥ (T − R)/(R − S) hold, implying that both
players sufficient punish the other’s defection.
The pure DD and CC states are both well known as Nash equilibrium and as Pareto op-
timal, respectively. Because the dominance of these states has been extensively studied, their
achievements here are not surprising. In these pure states, no exploitation appears, and both
players’ actions and payoffs are symmetric. Other states on the boundary of actions (such as
xe = 1, ye = 0) cannot be stable fixed points (see the Supporting Information for details). The
only other fixed points are given by the next case.
(3): When both x∗e and y
∗
e are neither 0 or 1, u
∗
C−u
∗
D = v
∗
C−v
∗
D = 0 should hold to satisfy the
fixed-point condition. Then, x˙C = ˙xD = ˙yC = ˙yD = 0 is satisfied. In such cases, the condition
of a fixed point for learning dynamics is
u∗C − u
∗
D = 0
⇔ y∗C − y
∗
D =
y∗e (T −R) + y
∗
e (P − S)
x∗e(R− S) + x
∗
e(T − P )
,
v∗C − v
∗
D = 0
⇔ x∗C − x
∗
D =
x∗e(T −R) + x
∗
e(P − S)
y∗e (R− S) + y
∗
e (T − P )
.
(15)
From Eqs. 15, the set of (x∗C , x
∗
D, y
∗
C , y
∗
D) achieving (x
∗
e , y
∗
e ) is uniquely given by
x∗C = x
∗
e + y
∗
e
x∗e(T −R) + x
∗
e(P − S)
y∗e (R− S) + y
∗
e (T − P )
,
x∗D = x
∗
e − y
∗
e
x∗e(T −R) + x
∗
e(P − S)
y∗e (R− S) + y
∗
e (T − P )
,
y∗C = y
∗
e + x
∗
e
y∗e (T −R) + y
∗
e (P − S)
x∗e(R− S) + x
∗
e(T − P )
,
y∗D = y
∗
e − x
∗
e
y∗e (T −R) + y
∗
e (P − S)
x∗e(R− S) + x
∗
e(T − P )
.
(16)
Note that as long as the two conditions u∗C − u
∗
D = v
∗
C − v
∗
D = 0 are satisfied within the region
0 ≤ x∗C , x
∗
D, y
∗
C , y
∗
D ≤ 1, the fixed point condition for (x
∗
C , x
∗
D, y
∗
C , y
∗
D) is satisfied. Thus, the
fixed points for learning dynamics exist again on a two(= 4 − 2)-dimensional space. Then, all
such fixed points are represented just as two variables (x∗e , y
∗
e ). According to Eq. 16, there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the 4-dimensional strategies of both players (x∗C , x
∗
D, y
∗
C , y
∗
D)
and (x∗e , y
∗
e ). Accordingly we use the plot (x
∗
e , y
∗
e ) in Fig. 3, instead of the four-dimensional space
for the fixed points, and will be adapted later.
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Although such two-dimensional fixed points exist for all sets of T,R, P, S, not all of them
are always reachable from the initial conditions. We further study the stability of the fixed
point by performing linear stability analysis around it. Here, we recall that there are only two
constraints on the four-dimensional dynamics. Thus, two of four eigenvalues always are zero,
and the stability is neutral in two-dimensional space.
Now, we examine the stability by the other two eigenvalues, as seen in Fig. 4-(A). The figure
shows that in the case of T −R−P +S ≤ 0, none of these novel fixed points has linear stability.
Thus, only the symmetric states, pure DD and CC, are achieved by learning dynamics.
In contrast, in the case of T −R−P+S > 0, the two-dimensional part of the fixed points sat-
isfies linear stability. For almost all of these points, x∗e 6= y
∗
e holds. Because x
∗
e 6= y
∗
e is equivalent
to the payoff inequality (u∗e 6= v
∗
e ), we refer to such states as exploitative relationships in which
one player receives more benefit than the other. Such stable two-dimensional exploitation also
appears even if the update speeds of the strategies are changed (see the Supporting Information
for the detailed results).
FIG. 4. (A) The region of stable fixed points in which both eigenvalues are negative. (B) Both players pay-
offs mapped from fixed points. (T, P, S) = (5, 1, 0) are fixed in all figures, and R is 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 3.999, 4.001
and 5.0 from left to right. In (A), the horizontal (vertical) axis indicates x∗
e
(y∗
e
). In the case of
(T + S)/2 ≤ R < T − P + S, in other words, 2.5 ≤ R < 4.0, there are two-dimensional fixed points
on (x∗
e
, y∗
e
) with player asymmetry. However, all of the fixed points become unstable in the case of
T − P + S < R ≤ T , in other words, 4.0 < R ≤ 5.0. In (B), the horizontal (vertical) axis indicates u∗
e
(v∗
e
). Red broken line indicates the possible set of both the payoffs. Orange (Green) dot indicates the
state of pure DD (CC) in all figures. Yellow (Red) dot indicates the most exploitative state from 1 to 2
(from 2 to 1).
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B. Characterization of the exploitative relationship
We now characterize the exploitative state by comparing the payoffs for T −R−P + S > 0.
Fig. 4-(B) shows both players’ payoffs at the stable fixed points. Especially when the degree of
exploitation, |x∗e − y
∗
e |, is large, the exploiting player obtains a higher payoff than that under the
pure CC, that is, R. Thus, one player is motivated to exploit the other rather than reciprocally
cooperate. However, the exploited player also receives a higher payoff than under the pure
DD, that is, P . Here, P is the minimax payoff in prisoner’s dilemma, and, thus, a player who
optimizes his/her own strategy obtains at least P . Therefore, this player has a motivation to
accept exploitation over mutual defection.
The exploitative relationship is characterized by the following two sets of equations (see the
Supporting Information for a detailed derivation). First, both xC−xD > 0 and yC−yD > 0 hold.
Here, xC − xD is the difference in cooperativity against the other player’s actions, which equals
the gradient of player 1’s response function. Because both values are positive, both players
are less cooperative against defection in the last round. Thus, the exploitative relationship is
supported by reciprocal punishments. Second, all of ∂x∗C/∂x
∗
e > 0, ∂x
∗
D/∂x
∗
e > 0, ∂x
∗
C/∂y
∗
e < 0,
and ∂x∗D/∂y
∗
e < 0 hold. Thus, an increase in exploitation from player 1 to player 2 (i.e., a
decrease in x∗e or an increase in y
∗
e ) leads to the decrease of x
∗
C , x
∗
D and the increase of y
∗
C , y
∗
D.
To summarize, it should be noted that the exploitative relationship is stabilized by both
players. The exploiting player guarantees that the other player receives a higher payoff than
that from the pure DD through appropriate punishment with small x∗D and x
∗
C . On the other
hand, the exploited player accepts the other player receiving a higher payoff than that under the
pure CC but simultaneously secures a higher payoff than that under the pure DD by utilizing a
weak punishment with large y∗D and y
∗
C . Importantly, this exploitative relationship is completely
different from that observed by Press and Dyson because it is achieved as a result of both players’
optimization.
The condition T −R−P +S > 0 can be intuitively interpreted from the perspectives of both
the exploiting and exploited players. From the perspective of exploiting player, the condition
written as T −R > P −S implies that a player’s change of action from C to D is more beneficial
when the other is C than D. In other words, the exploiting player is more motivated to defect
than the exploited player is. In contrast, from the perspective of the exploited player, the
condition written as R−T < S−P means that a player’s change of action from D to C is more
beneficial when the other is D than C. In other words, the exploited player is more motivated
to cooperate than the exploiting player is. Thus, the exploitative relationship is stabilized by
both the players; the exploiting (exploited) one’s motivation to defect (cooperate) is more. This
13
condition T −R−P +S > 0 is known as “submodular PD” in economics [16], so that we use this
term for this condition. In addition, the same condition is also observed in a biological study
[17]. However, why and how such a condition leads to the exploitation is first noted here.
IV. TRANSIENT DYNAMICS TO THE LEARNING EQUILIBRIUM
In § 3, we analyzed the fixed points and the linear stability in their neighborhoods. However,
this analysis is limited to only a small partition (i.e., the neighborhood of a two-dimensional
space at most) of the whole four-dimensional phase space given by (xC , xD, yC , yD). We now
study the transient dynamics to reach the learning equilibrium from arbitrary initial conditions
of the two players (xoC , x
o
D, y
o
C , y
o
D).
A. Characterization of transient dynamics
Despite that the attractors consist of the pure DD, CC, and various degrees of exploitative
state with two-dimensionality, the transient dynamics are categorized into the following several
cases.
Case (1): Direct convergence to a cooperative relationship. As easily guessed, a large xC and
a small xD encourage the other player to cooperate by punishing the other’s defection. Thus, as
Fig. 5-(A) shows, when both players have sufficiently strong punishments, they evolve towards
a cooperative relationship and converge to pure CC.
Here, we emphasize that the extreme limit of the punishment strategy is given by xC = 1
and xD = 0, which is the TFT strategy. In general, strategy (x
′
D, x
′
C) is closer to TFT than
strategy (xC , xD) is when both of x
′
C ≥ xC and x
′
D ≤ xD are satisfied. When only one of the
inequalities holds, however, the strategy that is closer to TFT is not defined.
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FIG. 5. Trajectories of strategies during the learning dynamics with a payoff matrix of (T,R, P, S) =
(5, 3.25, 1, 0). In all figures, (xoC , x
o
D, y
o
C) = (0.9, 0.1, 0.9) are fixed, with (A) y
o
D = 0.1, (B) y
o
D = 0.25,
(C) yoD = 0.65, and (D) y
o
D = 0.7. Thus, player 1’s strategy is fixed close to TFT, but player 2’s strategy
departs from TFT, ranging from (A) (closest) to (D) (farthest). Blue, green, red, and magenta solid lines
indicate xC , xD, yC , and yD, respectively. Yellow and cyan broken lines indicate xe and ye, respectively.
Note that only player 1’s trajectory is plotted in (A) because each of yC , yD, ye is equal to xC , xD, xe.
(A): Trajectories of Case (1). The player’s probabilities of cooperation increase throughout the dynamics
and converge to the pure CC. (B): Trajectories of Case (2). Both players first move toward the pure CC.
At time 10, however, player 1 takes advantage of player 2’s generous strategy (i.e., too much unconditional
cooperation) and increases his/her probability of defection. Against player 1’s behavior, player 2 does not
increase punishment to maintain the previous high probability of cooperation, which further increases
player 1’s defection probability. The finite degree of exploitation from player 1 to player 2 is thus fixed.
(C): Trajectories of Case (3). The initial asymmetry is larger than that in (B). Around time 5, the same
exploitation as in (B) emerges. From time 5 to time 10, however, player 2 increases his/her punishment
of player 1 decreasing yD. From time 10, both players punish each other and finally reach the pure CC.
(D): Trajectories of Case (4). Until time 5, the exploitation of player 2 by player 1 emerges, and from
time 5 to time 10, player 2 increases his/her punishment of player 1. From time 10 to time 20, however,
player 2’s excessive, one-sided punishment demands player 1’s unconditional cooperation, which results
in the reverse exploitative relationship from that in case (B).
Case (2): Exploitative relationship as a failure to reach cooperation. Fig. 5-(B) shows an
example of trajectory that reaches an asymmetric relationship in which one player exploits the
other. Initially, one player is closer to TFT than the other is. Both players pursue a cooperative
relationship by punishing each other (as in case (1)) in the beginning, but the latter player
becomes too cooperative to punish the other. Thus, the former player switches to defection, and
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the latter player’s strategy conversely increases the probability of cooperation regardless of the
former player’s defection. Thus, an exploitative relationship is achieved.
Case (3): Cooperative relationship recovered from exploitation. As seen in Fig. 5-(C), the
initial difference in the strategies is larger than that in Case (2). The player closer to TFT
initially starts to exploit the other (as in Case (2)). This exploitation, however, is too strong to
become stable, and the latter player increases punishment, leading to the cooperative relationship
found in case (1).
Case (4): Reversed exploitative relationship. An exploitative relationship is constructed
between asymmetric players as in Case (2), but now the relationship is reversed. Instead,
the player who is initially farther from TFT exploits the closer player, as seen in Fig. 5-(D).
The degree of punishment oscillates over time, and the player who more cooperative switches.
If the difference in initial strategies increases further, the oscillation lasts longer, and which
player exploits the other follows a complicated switching pattern. Finally, a reverse exploitative
relationship is achieved.
B. Basin structure for exploitative state
In the above, we have shown transient trajectories reaching final cooperative or exploitative
states. Now, we study the dependence of the final state after learning on the initial conditions.
First, if PD is not submodular, only the pure DD and CC strategies are stable. In these
cases, if the initial state (xoC , x
o
D, y
o
C , y
o
D) reaches the pure CC, any initial condition closer to
TFT (i.e., with either xo
′
C > x
o
C or x
o′
D < x
o
D) also reaches the pure CC, as shown in Fig. 6. Thus,
the basin structure, how each initial state reaches a final state, is simple.
FIG. 6. The degree of (A) exploitation (y∗
e
−x∗
e
) and (B) cooperation (x∗
e
+y∗
e
)/2 in the final state of learn-
ing dynamics is plotted by a color, against the initial condition (xoD, x
o
C) for (T,R, P, S) = (5, 4.5, 1, 0).
The horizontal (vertical) axis indicates xoD (x
o
C), and the player 2’s strategy is fixed at y
o
C = 0.8, y
o
D = 0.2.
In this case, only pure CC and DD strategies are stable fixed points for learning dynamics. The basin to
the pure CC (DD) strategy is plotted by white (black) points in the right figure.
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On the other hand, when PD is submodular, the basin structure is complicated as seen in
Fig. 7, in which pure CC and DD strategies and various degrees of exploitative relationships are
achieved. Slight differences in initial states lead to changes in the final state, especially near the
boundary of the basin to the pure DD.
From Fig. 7-(C), we observe successive changes of cases (1)-(4) and further oscillation of pun-
ishments, with the difference between both players’ initial strategies getting large. In addition,
note that the payoff (and action) at the basin boundary between the pure CC and exploitation
(i.e., case (1) and (2)) is discontinuous. The collapse of cooperation results in a rather large
degree of asymmetry in the payoffs. This discontinuous transition is due to positive feedback.
One player’s decrease in punishment to maintain cooperation and the other player’s defection
enhance each other.
Furthermore, Figs. 7-(A) and (B) shows how the basin structure changes depending on the
payoff matrix. When the benefit of reciprocal cooperation is minimal for the PD (R = (T+S)/2),
the region of cooperation is almost non-existent. In other words, however small the difference
between both players’ initial strategies is, the certain amount of exploitation is achieved as
if symmetry breaking, in some cases with the reverse of exploitative relationship. When R
increases, the slight difference in initial strategies can reach the symmetric cooperation. In
other words, the increase of R results in the extension (intension) of basin to the pure CC
(exploitation).
FIG. 7. Degrees of (A) exploitation of player 2 by player 1 (:= y∗
e
−x∗
e
) and (B) cooperation (:= (x∗
e
+y∗
e
)/2)
are plotted, against the initial values of (xoD, y
o
D). The horizontal (vertical) axis commonly indicates y
o
D
(xoD), and both x
o
C and y
o
C are fixed to 0.999. In both figures, (T, P, S) = (5, 1, 0) is fixed, and R equals
2.5, 2.75, 3.0, and 3.25 from left to right. Panel (C) shows both players’ payoffs u∗
e
(blue) and v∗
e
(red)
when xoD = 0.1 in R = 3.25. (#) indicates the trajectory case classified in § 4.1.
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V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this study, we formulated novel learning dynamics in which two players mutually update
their probabilistic conditional strategies through a repeated game. This learning process is
decomposed into frequency-dependent selection (i.e., the term xCxC) and adaptive learning
(i.e., the term ∂ue/∂xC).
We analyzed the fixed-point attractors of a dynamical system of strategies. Interestingly, in
addition to pure DD and CC strategies, two-dimensional neutral fixed points with an exploitative
relationship can be stably reached if PD is submodular. Even though the two players have the
same learning dynamics and intend to optimize their payoffs, an asymmetric relationship can
be achieved under certain conditions. Accordingly, when we observed exploitative relationship,
it is difficult to reason why one side is exploited by the other.
Our novel finding is that the exploitative relationship is stabilized by both the exploiting
and exploited players. The exploiting player receives a higher payoff than the other player
does and often receives a higher payoff than that under the pure CC. The exploited player
receives a lower payoff than the other player does but secures at least the minimax payoff,
which is obtained under the pure DD. In addition, this exploitative relationship is structured by
asymmetric punishments against the other player’s defection. Both players punish each other,
but the exploiting (exploited) player defects (cooperates) more than the other does.
We then analyze the transient dynamics for reaching the exploitative state. For submodular
PD, the feedback of punishment leads to the temporal oscillation of final state from cooperation
to exploitation, cooperation, exploitation by the other player, and so forth, depending on how
close the initial strategies are to TFT. The basin structure is complicated, and slight differences
in the initial strategies can lead to the drastic changes in the final state.
Complicated strategies with memories over many previous actions are sometimes studied
by using multi-agent learning models, such as the coupled neural networks. As a result of
reciprocal learning, an emergence of exploitative relationship [18] and the endogenous acquisition
of punishment [19] are observed at some stage in the iterated PD. However, whether the state is
stable or transient is not explored. To analyze such state is rather difficult, because the dynamics
are nondeterministic and extremely high-dimensional, as is generally seen in machine learning
studies. In contrast, our model is deterministic and low-dimensional, so that the stationary
exploitative state is clearly analyzed, which will also provide a basis to study the behavior of
complicated multi-agent systems.
Note that the PD game is the classic paradigm for the study of cooperation and defection.
Thus, the results of this study have general implications for the issues of cooperation, exploita-
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tion, and defection. Here, it is interesting to note that the emergence of exploitation depends
on the payoff matrix (T,R, P, S). We have shown that submodular PD (which includes the
standard case adopted in most previous studies, i.e., the matrix (5, 3, 1, 0)) generally justifies
exploitation from both the exploiting and exploited player’s perspectives.
It is often thought that exploitative relationships result from differences in players’ abilities
or environmental conditions. Whether and how players with the same learning abilities evolve
toward the “symmetry breaking” associated with exploitation remains unknown. We have shown
that exploitation can emerge even between players with same learning rule and the same payoff
based on differences in their initial strategies. Furthermore, the complicated basin structure
that we observe implies that slight difference in the initial strategies can lead to an unexpected
exploitation relationship with regard to which player exploits the other. This result provides a
novel perspective on the origins of exploitation and complex societal relationships.
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VII. ANALYSIS OF REPEATED GAME
In this section, we compute pe, the equilibrium state for the repeated game, in the main
manuscript, which satisfies
pe = Mpe (17)
Assuming 0 < xC , xD, yC , yD < 1, there exists only one equilibrium state pe by the full connec-
tivity of M . Then, we can separate M as
M :=


xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD
xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD
xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD
xC yC xD yC xC yD xD yD


=

 yC yD
yC yD

⊗

 xC xD
xC xD

 =: Y ⊗X
(18)
Here, · is defined as (1 − ·) as in the main manuscript. Note that ⊗ never represents the usual
Cartesian product but periodically operates between Y and X. In other words, we can also
separate pe as
pe = a⊗ b :=

 a1
a2

⊗

 b1
b2

 =


a1b1
a1b2
a2b1
a2b2


, (19)
and Y (X) operates a (b) with the output into b (a). Regardless of such a complicated operation
rule, since the equilibrium state is unique and fixed, we simply get
 Y a = bXb = a
⇔


a1 = a2 := xe =
xD + (xC − xD)yD
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
b1 = b2 := ye =
yD + (yC − yD)xD
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
.
(20)
In final, we obtain the equilibrium state of repeated game as
pe = (xe ye, xe ye, xe ye, xe ye)
T. (21)
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A. Introduction of response function and interpretation of equilibrium state
The above separation of M is useful for understanding not only the equilibrium state but
also the dynamical process itself with an idea of response function [Fujimoto2019]. We generally
assume a situation that every player makes an action unconditionally on the other’s previous
action, in other words, p is written by (x, x)T ⊗ (y, y)T with 0 < x, y < 1. Then, we can also
separate the next period state p′ as
p′ =

 fx
fx

⊗

 fy
fy

 . (22)
Then, from Eqs. 18 and 22, we derive fx and fy as

 fx
fx

 =

 xC xD
xC xD



 y
y


⇔ fx(y) = y(xC − xD) + xD,
 fy
fy

 =

 yC yD
yC yD



 x
x


⇔ fy(x) = x(yC − yD) + yD.
(23)
Thus, fx (i.e., 1’s probability to cooperate in the next period) is given by the linear function to
2’s probability to cooperate in the present period y, with the segment of xC (xD) for y = 1 (0).
The case of 2 is obtained in the same way. Since fx and fy represent the player’s responding
action to the other’s previous action, we call them response functions following the previous
study [Fujimoto2019]. Furthermore, the equilibrium state (xe, ye) corresponds to the crossing
point of response functions, in other words, we get
xe = fx(ye),
ye = fy(xe).
(24)
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VIII. DERIVATION OF LEARNING DYNAMICS
In this section, we derive the learning dynamics represented by Eqs. 7, 9, and 10 in the main
manuscript. For it, we need to compute uC − uD, which is given by
uC − uD =
∞∑
t=0
M t(p1C − p1D) · (R,S, T, P )
T
=
{
∞∑
te=0
(xC − xD)
te(yC − yD)
te(p1C − p1D) +
∞∑
to=0
(xC − xD)
to(yC − yD)
to+1(p2C − p2D)
}
· (R,S, T, P )T
=
(yC − yD){xe(R− S) + xe(T − P )} − {ye(T −R) + ye(P − S)}
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
(25)
Here, we define p2C := (xe, 0, xe, 0) and p2D := (0, xe, 0, xe). Furthermore, from line 1 to 2, we
used
M(p1C − p1D) = (yC − yD)(p2C − p2D),
M(p2C − p2D) = (xC − xD)(p1C − p1D),
(26)
which are straightforwardly derived. In the same way, we obtain vC − vD as
vC − vD =
(xC − xD){ye(R − S) + ye(T − P )} − {xe(T −R) + xe(P − S)}
1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)
. (27)
A. Interpretation of learning dynamics
The learning dynamics of xC , xD, yC , and yD are intuitively interpreted by using the above
response function. We focus on the second term, in other words, ye, ye, xe, and xe in equations
of x˙C , ˙xD, ˙yC , and ˙yD, respectively. We directly obtain(
∂xe
∂xC
,
∂xe
∂xD
,
∂ye
∂yC
,
∂ye
∂yD
)
= (ye, ye, xe, xe)/{1 − (xC − xD)(yC − yD)}. (28)
These equations show that the movement of crossing point (xe, ye) by the change of xC , xD, yC ,
and yD is proportional to (ye, ye, xe, xe), i.e., the second term in Eqs.7, 9, and 10 in the main
manuscript, respectively.
Next, we also focus on the third term, in other words, uC − uD in x˙C , ˙xD and vC − vD in
˙yC , ˙yD, respectively. It is directly obtained that
du(xe, fy(xe))
dxe
=
∂u
∂x
∣∣∣∣
eq
+ (yC − yD)
∂u
∂y
∣∣∣∣
eq
= −{ye(T −R) + ye(P − S)}+ (yC − yD){xe(R− S) + xe(T − P )}
= (uC − uD)× {1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)},
dv(ye, fx(ye))
dye
= (vC − vD)× {1− (xC − xD)(yC − yD)}.
(29)
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Here, u(x, fy(x)) and v(y, fx(y)) indicate 1’s and 2’s own payoff with recognizing the other’s
response function, respectively. Thus, Eqs. 29 show that each player’s gap of payoffs between C
and D is proportional to the gradient of the own payoff on the other’s response function.
Finally, we obtain
x˙C = xCxC
∂u(xe, fy(xe))
∂xC
,
˙xD = xDxD
∂u(xe, fy(xe))
∂xD
,
˙yC = yCyC
∂v(ye, fx(ye))
∂yC
,
˙yD = yDyD
∂v(ye, fx(ye))
∂yD
.
(30)
IX. ANALYSIS OF FIXED POINTS
In this section, we prove that the stable fixed points on the boundary of actions, i.e., either
with xe = 0, 1 or ye = 0, 1, are only pure CC (xe = ye = 1) and DD (xe = ye = 0). In
the beginning, we categorize fixed points on the boundary actions into (1). xe = ye = 0, (2).
xe = 0, 0 < ye < 1, (3). xe = 0, ye = 1, (4). 0 < xe < 1, ye = 1, and (5). xe = ye = 1. Here, we
assume xe ≤ ye without losing the generality. We have already analyzed cases of (1) and (5), in
other words, pure CC and DD in the main manuscript.
(2): From xe = 0 and 0 < ye < 1, we get xC = xD = 0 and yD = ye. However, since
vC − vD < 0 always holds, ˙yD is negative, which results in the decrease of ye. In other words,
all the states of xe = 0, 0 < ye < 1 are not fixed points themselves.
(3): From xe = 0 and ye = 1, we get xC = 0 and yD = 1. Then, since x˙C = ˙xD = ˙yC = ˙yD = 0
hold, the states can be fixed points. However, since vC − vD < 0 always holds, ˙yD is negative in
the neighbor of all the fixed points. Therefore, all the states of xe = 0 and ye = 1 are unstable,
and resulting in the deviation from them.
(4): From 0 < xe < 1 and ye = 1, we get xC = xe and yC = yD = 1. However, since
xC − xD < 0 always holds, x˙C is negative, which results in the decrease of xe. In other words,
all the states of 0 < xe < 1 and ye = 1 are not fixed points themselves.
X. CHARACTERIZATION OF EXPLOITATIVE RELATIONSHIP
In this section, we derive the character of exploitative relationship, where (1) every player
punishes the defector to some degree, and (2) one player gets closer to defector with the extension
of exploitative relationship (xe − ye).
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First, (1) needs xC − xD > 0 in equilibrium for all 0 ≤ xe, ye ≤ 1. These are proven as
xC − xD =
xe(T −R) + xe(P − S)
ye(R− S) + ye(T − P )
> 0
(31)
Here, we use the condition for prisoner’s dilemma (T > R > P > S).
Second, (2) needs all of ∂xC/∂ye < 0, ∂xD/∂ye < 0, ∂xC/∂xe > 0, and ∂xD/∂xe > 0. We
can prove them as
∂xC
∂ye
= −
(R− S){xe(T −R) + xe(P − S)}
{ye(R− S) + ye(T − P )}2
< 0,
∂xD
∂ye
= −
(T − P ){xe(T −R) + xe(P − S)}
{ye(R− S) + ye(T − P )}2
< 0,
∂xC
∂xe
=
ye(T −R) + ye(T − 2P + S) + ye(R − S)
ye(R − S) + ye(T − P )
> 0,
∂xD
∂xe
=
ye(T − P ) + ye(−T + 2R − S) + ye(P − S)
ye(R − S) + ye(T − P )
> 0.
(32)
Here, from line 5 to 6 and from line 7 to 8, we additionally use the condition T + S > 2P and
T + S < 2R, respectively, which are derived from submodular condition.
The same equations hold for player 2 as
yC − yD > 0,
∂yC
∂xe
< 0,
∂yD
∂xe
< 0,
∂yC
∂ye
> 0,
∂yD
∂ye
> 0.
(33)
A. Analysis of exploitation
In this section, we derive the boundaries of exploitative relationship. From the Eqs. 16 in
the main manuscript, we get the boundary conditions for (xe, ye) as
x∗C = 1
⇔ −2(T −R− P + S)x∗ey
∗
e + (2T −R− 2P + S)x
∗
e + (T −R− 2P + 2S)y
∗
e
− (T − 2P + S) = 0,
x∗D = 0
⇔ −2(T −R− P + S)x∗ey
∗
e + (T − P )x
∗
e − (P − S)y
∗
e = 0.
(34)
The boundary conditions for y∗C = 1 and y
∗
D = 0 are obtained in the same way. Fig. S1 shows
each of the boundary conditions of exploitative relationship on the (xe, ye)-plane.
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FIG. S 1. The boundaries of region of stable fixed points for (T,R, P, S) = (5, 3, 1, 0). Blue, red, orange,
and green solid line indicates the boundaries by x∗C = 1, x
∗
D = 0, y
∗
C = 1, and y
∗
D = 0, respectively.
Brown (Purple) dot indicates the most exploitative state from 1 to 2 (form 2 to 1).
Furthermore, we also compute the most exploitative state from 1 to 2, where y∗e − x
∗
e is
maximized within the region of stable fixed points. As shown in Fig. S1, such a state is equivalent
to the crossing point of the lines (xe, ye) given by the conditions y
∗
C = 1 and x
∗
D = 0. This is
obtained as 

x∗e =
P − S
(R− S) + (P − S)
y∗e =
T − P
(T −R) + (T − P )
. (35)
The most exploitative relationship from 2 to 1 is obtained in the same way.
As an example, we concretely obtain the maximal degree of exploitation that can be estab-
lished for the standard prisoner’s dilemma (T,R, P, S) = (5, 3, 1, 0). When 1 maximally exploits
2, the equilibrium state and payoff are given by
 x
∗
e = 1/4
y∗e = 2/3
,

 u
∗
e = 13/4
v∗e = 7/6
. (36)
This demonstrates, we can confirm that the exploiting side 1 gets more payoff than pure CC
(u∗e > R), and the exploited side gets more payoff than (minimax) pure DD (v
∗
e > P ).
XI. DEPENDENCE ON LEARNING SPEEDS
In this section, we study how the region of stable fixed points changes, when the difference
in learning speeds between the players is introduced. Here we define S1C , S1D, S2C , and S2D as
the speeds for the relaxation of xC , xD, yC , and yD, respectively. Thus we extend our learning
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dynamics (Eqs. 7, 9, and 10 in main manuscript) as
x˙C = S1CxCxCye(uC − uD),
˙xD = S1DxDxDye(uC − uD),
˙yC = S2CyCyCxe(vC − vD),
˙yD = S2DyDyDxe(vC − vD).
(37)
Of course, the case of S1C = S1D = S2C = S2D (i.e., symmetric learning speeds) is equivalent to
the original model. Now we consider two kinds of asymmetry: One is the asymmetry between C
and D, i.e., SC := S1C = S2C and SD := S1D = S2D but SC 6= SD. The other is the asymmetry,
between players, i.e., S1 := S1D = S1C and S2 := S2D = S2C but S1 6= S2.
FIG. S 2. (A): The stable fixed points for learning dynamics in which both players’ cooperation is faster
than those of defection (SC ≥ SD). (B): The stable fixed points for learning dynamics in which learning
speeds of defection is faster than those of cooperation (SD ≥ SC). (C): Classification of two eigenvalues
except for 0 for learning dynamics in which 1’s learning speeds are faster than 2 (S1 ≥ S2). Cyan, yellow,
and red dots indicate the eigenvalues are (−,−) with rotation, (−,−) without rotation, and (+,−),
respectively. From left to right, the difference of learning speed is 1, 3, 10 and 30 times.
Fig. S2-(A) shows how the region of stable fixed points changes when the learning of co-
operation is faster than defection (SC ≥ SD). Here, recall that the dynamics of xC (yC) are
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slower near the boundary xC = 1 (yC = 1) because of the frequency-dependent selection term.
In addition, the faster the learning of cooperation is, the more difficult to achieve a state with
0 < xC < 1 and 0 < yC < 1 is. Therefore, the region in which stable fixed points exist is limited
around the boundary of either xC = 1 or yC = 1 (Compare Fig. S2-(A) and Fig. S1).
Fig. S2-(B) shows how the region of stable fixed points changes when the learning of defection
is faster than cooperation (SD ≥ SC). For the same reason, the region in which stable fixed
points exist is also limited around the boundary of either xD = 0 or yD = 0 (Compare Fig. S2-(B)
and Fig. S1).
Fig. S2-(C) shows that the region of stable fixed points is constant even if both the players’
learning speeds are different. However, the real and imaginary part of eigenvalues can change.
Around the boundary of y∗C = 1 (and also in the vicinity of y
∗
D = 0), the oscillational dynamics
hardly appears because of the relative slowness of yC and yD.
Additionally note that the most exploitative state from 1 to 2, in which x∗C = 1 and y
∗
D = 0
are satisfied, is stable for all learning speeds. Such a state is easy to be achieved, because the
dynamics of two of four variables are slow around them.
